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ABSTRACT
In an increasingly digital world, identifying signs of online extrem-
ism sits at the top of the priority list for counter-extremist agencies.1
Researchers and governments are investing in the creation of ad-
vanced information technologies to identify and counter extremism
through intelligent large-scale analysis of online data. However, to
the best of our knowledge, these technologies are neither based on,
nor do they take advantage of, the existing theories and studies of
radicalisation. In this paper we propose a computational approach
for detecting and predicting the radicalisation influence a user is
exposed to, grounded on the notion of ’roots of radicalisation’ from
social science models. This approach has been applied to analyse
and compare the radicalisation level of 112 pro-ISIS vs.112 “general"
Twitter users. Our results show the effectiveness of our proposed
algorithms in detecting and predicting radicalisation influence, ob-
taining up to 0.9 F-1 measure for detection and between 0.7 and 0.8
precision for prediction. While this is an initial attempt towards
the effective combination of social and computational perspectives,
more work is needed to bridge these disciplines, and to build on
their strengths to target the problem of online radicalisation.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the process of radicalisation took place through phys-
ical interaction in social environments, such as in places of worship,
prisons, and meeting venues. However, in recent years this process
hasmigrated to the virtual environment of the Internet, wheremany
terrorist organisations are now using social media to promote their
ideology and propaganda, and to recruit individuals to their cause.
With the spread of social media and encrypted communications,
not only radicalisation but also operational planning can easily
1http://www.voxpol.eu/identifying-radical-content-online/
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the
author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission
and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
WebSci ’18, May 27–30, 2018, Amsterdam, Netherlands
© 2018 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to the
Association for Computing Machinery.
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-5563-6/18/05. . . $15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/3201064.3201082
occur entirely online.2 Recruitment conversations often start with
open social media sites (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, Tumblr, Ask.fm,
Instagram, YouTube, etc.) and then move onto private messages
with target individuals.
A well known example is the so-called Islamic State (IS), which is
arguably one of the leading organisations in the use of social media
for sharing their propaganda, for raising funds, and for radicalising
and recruiting individuals around the globe. According to a 2015
U.S government report,3 this organisation succeeded in recruiting
more than 25,000 foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, including 4,500
from Europe and North America. In a desperate attempt to disrupt
and disconnect such radicalisation channels, some governments,
organisations, and social media platforms continuously search and
disable social media accounts that are found to be associated with
such terrorist groups. For example, in response to the Paris attacks
in November 2015, the hacker community Anonymous took down
more than 20,000 Twitter accounts that were allegedly linked to ISIS.
However, the method they deployed to categorise such accounts
was too imperfect, evidenced by their inclusion in the blockage
the social media accounts of the U.S president Barack Obama, the
White House, the BBC, the New York Times, and many other anti
IS accounts.4
Parallel to the development of these systems and methods, mul-
tiple models have emerged from psychology and social sciences
that aim to investigate what are the factors that drive people to get
radicalised [25] (e.g., failed integration, poverty, discrimination),
their different roots [31][9] (micro-level, or individual level, meso-
level, or group/community level, and macro-level, or global level,
the influence of government and society at home and abroad), and
how the radicalisation process happens and evolves, i.e., what are
its different stages [33] (e.g., pre-radicalisation, self-identification,
indoctrination, Jihadisation).
It is however difficult to understand how the radicalisation pro-
cess tends to kickstart and evolve online, especially when the
amount of traffic generated in social media is so vast. Manual anal-
ysis is impractical and thus automatic techniques need to be used.
We need to look at online radicalisation as a process, and to lever-
age closer the knowledge of theoretical models of radicalisation
to design more effective technological solutions to tracking online
radicalisation. To bridge this gap, our work investigates two main
research questions:
• How can we translate the different aspects of social theories
of radicalisation into computational methods to enable the
automatic identification of radicalised behaviour? This work
proposes an approach based on Natural Language Processing
2https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/2016-07-26/
myth-lone-wolf-terrorism
3https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf
4http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/34919781/anonymous-anti-islamic-state-list%
2Dfeatures-obama-and-bbc-news
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(NLP) and Collaborative Filtering (CF), that automatically
captures the different roots of radicalisation (micro, meso and
macro) [31] for each user and represents them as keyword-
based vector descriptions.
• How the incorporation of theoretical perspectives into computa-
tional approaches can help us to develop effective radicalisation
detection and prediction approaches? Based on our proposed
keyword-based representation, we propose an approach to
automatically detect and predict the level of radicalisation
influence a user is subjected to. Note that our aim is not to
determine whether someone is being radicalised or not, but
to provide a risk level for each user based on the individual,
social and global influences to which she is exposed to in
social media. To assess this risk, we take into account the
social media history of a user (in this case, the Twitter time-
lines - up to a maximum of 3,200 posts per user, which is the
limit imposed by Twitter in their API)
By investigating these research questions, we provide the fol-
lowing contributions:
• A summary and analysis of a wide range of theories andmod-
els of radicalisation, including their different roots, factors
and stages involved in the process.
• The translation of the different roots of radicalisation (micro-
individual-, meso-social- and macro-global-) into computa-
tional elements to study their impact on the radicalisation
process of different users.
• The development of an approach that automatically assigns
each user a risk of radicalisation based on the the individual,
social and global influences to which she is exposed to in
social media
The following sections are structured as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes a compendium of different theories and models of radical-
isation, as well as the different automatic approaches that have
been proposed so far in the literature to detect radicalisation online.
Section 3 shows our proposed approach to automatically identify
the individual, meso and macro level influence of online content on
each user, as well as our approach to automatically compute a score
of radicalisation for each user based on these influences. Section 4
discusses our evaluation of this model. An in-depth discussion of
our findings is reported in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes.
2 STATE OF THE ART
Understanding the mechanisms that govern the process of radicali-
sation, and online radicalisation in particular, has been the topic
of investigation in the domain of social sciences and psychology
[25][31], in computing technology [5], and in policing [33].
In this section, we first take a look at theoretical studies to get in-
sights into the different models that have been proposed to describe
the radicalisation process, its roots, influencing factors and stages.
We then focus on those works that have addressed the problem
from a computational perspective. As a result of the analysis of
these theories and the observation of how previous computational
approaches have targeted the problem, we propose an integrated
approach that can be used to capture how the different roots influ-
ence the process of online radicalisation and to detect the level of
radicalisation influence each user is undergoing.
2.1 Models of Radicalisation
Different models have been proposed in the literature that aim to
capture the process of radicalisation [18].5
In 2003 Borum [8] proposed a four-staged radicalisation model.
The first stage, context, begins by identifying some event or con-
dition as being “not right”; poverty, unemployment, government-
imposed restrictions, etc. People in the first stage display a propen-
sity of being radicalised. The second stage, comparison, is formed
when such event or condition is framed as unjust in comparison
to others. In the third stage, attribution, the injustice is blamed
on a target policy, person or nation. Second and third stages are
understood as the process of indoctrination. Finally, in the fourth
stage, reaction, the responsible party is vilified, often demonised,
to facilitate justification for aggression. This last stage falls under
extremism. When discussing the motives leading to these stages,
Borum highlights the importance of the information the user is
exposed to; her values and her life experiences. In a most recent
publication he stresses the need of investigating the role that the
different roots micro (individual) -meso (group) and macro (global)
play in understanding the etiology of radicalisation.[9]
Moghaddam proposed in 2005 the stair-case model of radicalisa-
tion [25]. This model describes a similar progression to the model
proposed by Borum [8]. The initial step, perceived deprivation,
starts with feelings of discontent and perceived adversity, which
people seek to alleviate. When those attempts are unsuccessful,
they become frustrated, perceived options to unfair treatment,
leading to feelings of aggression, displacement of aggression,
which are displaced on to some perceived causal agent (who is then
regarded as an enemy). With increasing anger directed towards
the enemy, some come to sympathise with the violent, extrem-
ist ideology of the terrorist groups that act against them; moral
engagement. Some of those sympathisers eventually join an ex-
tremist group, organisation or movement that advocates for, and
perhaps engages in, terrorist violence; legitimacy of the terror-
ist organisation. At the top or final level among those who have
joined are those who overcome any barriers to action and actually
commit a terrorist attack; the terrorist act. The validity of this
linear stepwise model has been criticised, suggesting that multiple
mechanisms/factors could combine in different ways to produce
terrorism [23].
In 2007 the New York Police Department (NYPD) published their
own model of radicalisation [33], focused on Jihadi-Salafi ideology
and “the west”. This model is composed of four distinct phases.
Pre-radicalisation; most individuals at this stage have lived “or-
dinary” lives and have little, if any criminal history. In a second
stage, self-identification, individuals, influenced by both, internal
and external factors, (loosing a job, alienation and discrimination,
death in the close family, etc.) begin to explore Salafi Islam. In the
third phase, indoctrination, individuals progressively intensify
their beliefs and conclude that circumstances exist where action
is required to support the cause. In the final phase, jihadisation,
individuals accept their individual duty to participate in violent
jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors. The model
also highlights the influence of the individual, group, and global
5http://wanainstitute.org/sites/default/files/publications/Publication_
UnderstandingRadicalisation_SecondEditionJuly2017.pdf
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roots of radicalisation in this process. In particular they highlight
“group-think” as one of the most powerful catalysts for leading an
individual and/or group to commit a terrorist attack. The model
states that all individuals that begin the radicalisation process do not
necessarily pass through all the stages and that many do abandon
the process at different points. Although the model is sequential,
individuals do not always follow a perfectly linear progression, and
individuals who do pass through this entire process are likely to be
involved in the planning or implementation of a terrorist attack.
McCauley and Moskalenko proposed another model in 2008 [24].
This model also highlights the importance of the different roots of
radicalisation. Individuals are radicalised by personal grievances
(micro), group grievances (meso) and by global factors like mass-
media (macro). Based on these roots the model defines twelve mech-
anisms of radicalisation. Mechanisms associated with individual
factors include personal victimisation and political grievance.
Mechanisms associated with group factors include joining a rad-
ical group, either via step-by step self-persuasion -the slippery
slope- or via personal connections with people who are already rad-
icalised (friends, loved ones, family members) -the power of love-.
They also include extremity shift in like-minded individuals
or group polarisation, where like-minded individuals join under
discussion groups and feed each other with more and more extreme
views; extreme cohesion under isolation and threat, which
generally occurs in small combat groups where members can trust
only one another; competition for the same base of support,
where a subgroup gain status by proposing/conducting more radi-
cal actions in support of a cause; competition with state power,
where violent government reactions against civil disobedience cre-
ate sympathy for the victims of state repression; andwithin group
competition, where competition within the group provokes the
group to fission in radical subgroups. Macro mechanisms include
Jujitsu politics, where displays of patriotism or nationalism cre-
ate cohesion within the minority/discriminated group, hate, where
mass conflicts become more extreme andmartyrdom where indi-
viduals giving their life for the cause obtain the status of heroes,
giving some people a life purpose.
In 2014, Kruglanski and colleagues [21] presented a new model
or radicalisation, and de-radicalisation, based on the notion that
the quest for personal significance constitutes a major motivational
force that may push individuals towards violent extremism. This
model is composed by three key components. Themotivational
component or the quest for personal significance, represents the
goal to which one may be committed. The ideological compo-
nent identifies the means of violence as appropriate for this goal’s
pursuit. The social component, or the process of networking and
group dynamics through which the individual comes to share in
the violence-justifying ideology. This model highlights the need of
defining radicalisation as a process with different degrees.
More recently (2015), Hafez and Mullins [17] have focused on Is-
lamic extremism in the West. In their model they highlight four fac-
tors that come together to produce violent radicalisation.Grievances
include economic marginalisation and cultural alienation, deeply
held sense of victimisation, or strong disagreements regarding the
foreign policies of states. Networks refer to preexisting friendship
ties between ordinary individuals and radicals that lead to the dif-
fusion of extreme beliefs. Ideologies refer to master narratives
about the world and one’s place in it. Enabling environments
and support structures encompass physical and virtual settings
such as the Internet, social media, prisons, or foreign terrorist train-
ing camps that provide ideological and material aid for radicalising
individuals. While some of these factors are very similar to the
ones highlighted in previous models, the authors propose a puzzle
metaphor, i.e., a nonlinear, evolutionary approach to radicalisation,
rejecting the idea of a sequential process of steps, as proposed by
previous models [8][25].
As we can see in all these models, radicalisation often starts
with individuals who are frustrated with their lives, society or their
governments and their policies. These individuals meet other like-
minded people, and start being influenced by information, ideas
and events that ultimately can result in terrorism. However, the
radicalisation process does not unfold in the sameway for all people.
The mechanism will vary even among those who may be exposed
to the same factors and conditions. Radicalisation occurs through a
process, typically either through gradual escalation, or as a series
of discrete actions or decisions [9]. What all these models highlight
are the different roots that influence the radicalisation process of a
user:
• Micro or Individual roots: The micro roots of radicalisa-
tion relate to factors self-affecting the individual. Perceptions
of deprivation, perceived procedural injustice, and symbolic
and realistic threat can motivate individuals to seek out ex-
treme organisations [34]
• Meso or group/community roots: Individuals find sup-
port for their ideas and a relationship within a group or
community. Some individuals are attracted to a group due
to the perceived legitimacy of this group, others via love
connections (friends, loved ones or family members who
are already part of the group). Groups often use comparison
with other groups to show injustice which often creates us-
versus-them thinking. Besides the group identity and social
interaction, individuals can also be attracted to radicalisation
through the use of radical rhetoric by the group
• Macro or global roots: Macro roots include the influence of
government and society at home and abroad. Typical exam-
ples are the effect of globalisation and modernisation as well
as foreign policy of some (Western) countries. While globali-
sation can threaten the group identity it can also expand the
radical group by feeding the us-versus-them thinking.
As we can see from our literature analysis, there is a clear as-
sociation between the three roots of radicalisation (micro, meso
and macro) and the various factors and stages identified in the
models or frameworks of radicalisation. While those roots origi-
nally developed from off-line interactions (e.g., attending mosques
to discuss radical views) they are now rapidly developing online.
Edwards and colleagues [14, 36] investigated internet radicalisation
in Europe by speaking with convicted terrorists. Among the salient
findings of their work they highlighted that: (i) the internet in-
creases opportunities for self-radicalisation (micro), (ii) the internet
allows radicalisation to occur without physical contact by replacing
in-person meetings by in-person communication, and by enabling
connection with like-minded individuals from across the world 24/7
(meso) and (iii) the internet creates more opportunities to become
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radicalised by providing access to information and propaganda, as
well as by acting as echo-chamber for extremist believes (macro).
2.2 Computational approaches
Researchers from the areas of counter-terrorism and cyber-security
have begun to examine the radicalisation phenomenon and to un-
derstand the social media presence and actions of extremist organ-
isations [1]. In this section we summarise some of these compu-
tational approaches developed towards the analysis, detection
and prediction of radicalisation. A summary of these approaches,
their goals, the data they used, their key conclusions, and whether
they make use of previous knowledge of social science models (see
Section 2.1) is reported in Table 1
Among the works developed towards analysing the online radi-
calisation phenomenon we can highlight the works of Klausen [19],
Carter [11], Chatfield [12], Vergani [35] and Rowe [28].
Klausen [19] studied the role of social media, and particularly
Twitter, in the jihadists’ operational strategy in Syria and Iraq.
During 2014, they collected information on 59 Twitter accounts of
Western-origin fighters known to be in Syria, and their networks
(followers and followees), leading to a total of 29,000 studied ac-
counts. The 59 original accounts were manually identified by the
research team. They used known network metrics, like degree-
centrality, number of followers or number of tweets, to identify
the most influential users. The authors also conducted a manual
analysis of the top recent posts of influential individuals to deter-
mine the key topics of conversation (religious instruction, reporting
battle and interpersonal communication), as well as the content
of pictures and videos. The study highlights the direction of the
communication flow, from the terrorist accounts, to the fighters
based in the insurgent zones, to the followers in the west, and the
prominence of female members acting as propagandist.
Carter [11], collected during 12 months information from 190
social media accounts of Western and European foreign fighters
affiliated with Jabhat al-Nusrah and ISIS. These accounts were man-
ually identified and comprise both, Facebook and Twitter accounts.
The paper aimed to examine how foreign fighters receive informa-
tion and who inspires them. The analysis looked at the most popular
Facebook pages by “likes”, or the most popular Twitter accounts
by “follows”, as well as the numbers of comments and shares of
different posts. The paper also looked at the word clouds of different
profiles ,revealing terms like (islamic, Allah, fight, Mujahideen, ISIS,
etc.) The paper reveals the existence of spiritual authorities who
foreign fighters go to for inspiration and guidance.
Chatfield [12] investigated how ISIS members/supporters used
Twitter to radicalise and recruit other users. For this purpose they
study 3,039 tweets from one account of a known ISIS “information
disseminator”. Two annotators categorised those posts manually
as: propaganda (information), radicalisation (believes in support of
a intergroup conflict and violence), terrorist recruitment (enticing
others to join in fighting the jihad war) and other. Examples of these
tweets and their content is provided as a result of this exercise. The
analysis also studies the frequency and times of posting, indicating
him as highly active user, as well as the network of users mentioned
in the tweets, which were manually categorised as: international
media, regional Arabic media, IS sympathisers and IS fighters.
Vergani [35] investigated the evolution of the ISIS’s language
by analysing the text contained in the first 11 issues of Dabiq;
the official ISIS internet magazine in English. To conduct their
analysis they made use of the Linguistic Inquiry and and Word
Count (LIWC) text analysis program. Their analysis highlights:
(i) the use of expressions related to achievement, affiliation and
power, (ii) a focus on emotional language, which is considered
to be effective in mobilising individuals, (ii) frequent mentions of
death, female, and religion, which are related to the ISIS ideology
and the recruitment of women to the cause and (iv) the use of
internet jargon (“btw”, “lol”, etc.), which may be more effective in
establishing a communication with the youngest generations of
potential recruits.
While [11, 12, 19] studied the social media behaviour of users
once radicalised, Rowe and Saif [28] studied the social media ac-
tions and interactions of Europe-based Twitter users before, dur-
ing, and after they exhibited pro-ISIS behaviour. Starting from 512
radicalised Twitter accounts, manually identified in the work of
O’Callagan [26], they collected their followers, filtered those based
in Europe and determined whether those followers were radicalised
based on two hypothesis: (i) use of pro-ISIS terminology, a lexicon
was generated to test this hypothesis, and (ii) content shared from
pro-ISIS accounts. Their filtering process lead to the study of 727
pro-ISIS Twitter accounts and their complete timelines. The study
concluded that prior to being activated/radicalised users go through
a period of significant increase in adopting innovations (i.e., com-
municating with new users and adopting new terms). They also
highlight that social homophily has a strong bearing on the diffu-
sion process of pro-ISIS terminology through Twitter.
Bermingham and colleagues [7] looked at the user profiles and
comments of a YouTube video group which purpose was “the con-
version of infidels” with the aim of assessing whether users were
being radicalised by the group and how this was reflected in com-
ments and interactions. They collected a total of 135,000 comments
posted by 700 members and 13,000 group contributors. They per-
formed term frequency to observe the top-terms used in the group
as well as sentiment analysis over a subset of comments filtered by
a list of keywords of interest (Islam, Israel, Palestine, etc.). They also
used centrality measures to identify influencers. They observed that
the group was mostly devoted to religious discussion (not radicali-
sation) and that female users show more extreme and less tolerant
views.
Regarding detectionwe can highlight the works of Berger [5, 6],
Agarwal [2], Ashcroft [3] and Saif [29].
In 2013 Berger and Strathearn [5] developed an approach to
detect individuals more prone to extremism (in this case white
supremacy) among those with interest in violent ideologies. Their
approach started by collecting the social networks of twelve known
extremists on Twitter (3,542 accounts were collected using this pro-
cess and a maximum of 200 tweets per account was analysed) and
measuring three dimensions for each user: (i) their influence (num-
ber of times their content was retweeted), (ii) exposure (number
of times they retweeted other’s content) and (iii) interactivity (by
looking for keywords in tweets like DM -Direct Message- or email).
They concluded that high scores of influence and exposure showed
a strong correlation to engagement with the extremist ideology.
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Table 1: Computational approaches towards the analysis (A), detection (D) and prediction (P) of radicalisation. SMM refers to
the use of Social Science Models
Work Goal Data Conclusions SSM
Klausen [19] A Study Influence in the jihadists’
operational strategy in Syria
and Iraq
59 pro-ISIS Twitter accounts (man-
ually assessed) and their networks
(29,000 accounts)
Communication flow, from the terrorist accounts, to
the fighters based in the insurgent zones, to the fol-
lowers in the west. Prominence of female members
acting as propagandist
no
Carter [11] A Examine how foreign fighters
receive information and who
inspires them
190 pro-ISIS Twitter and Face-
book accounts (manually assessed)
existence of spiritual authorities who foreign fighters
look to for inspiration and guidance
no
Chatfield [12] A Investigate how ISIS mem-
bers/supporters used Twitter
to radicalise and recruit other
users
3,039 tweets from one account of a
known ISIS "information dissemina-
tor" (Twitter)
Posts about propaganda, radicalisation and terrorist
recruitment mentioning international media, regional
Arabic media, IS sympathisers and IS fighters
no
Vergani [35] A Investigated the evolution of
the ISIS’s language
first 11 issues of Dabiq, the official
ISIS’s internet magazine
Use expressions related to achievement, affiliation and
power. Emotional language. Mentions of death female
and religion and use of internet jargon
no
Rowe [28] A Study Europe-based Twitter
users before, during, and af-
ter they exhibited pro-ISIS be-
haviour to better understand
the radicalisation process
727 pro-ISIS Twitter accounts. Cat-
egorised as pro-ISIS base on the use
of radicalised terminology and shar-
ing from radicalised accounts
Prior to being activated/radicalised users go through a
period of significant increase in adopting innovations
(i.e. communicating with new users and adopting new
terms). Social homophily has a strong bearing on the
diffusion process of pro-ISIS terminology.
no
Bermingham [7]
A
Explore the use of sentiment
and network analysis to deter-
mine whether a YouTube group
was used as radicalisation chan-
nel
135,000 comments and 13,700 user
profiles. YouTube group manually
assessed
The group was mostly devoted to religious discussion
(not radicalisation). Female users show more extreme
and less tolerant views
no
Berger [5] D Identify individuals prone to ex-
tremism from the followers of
extremist accounts
3,542 Twitter accounts (followers
of 12 known pro-ISIS accounts)
High scores of influence an exposure showed a strong
correlation to engagement with the extremist ideol-
ogy (manual evaluation)
no
Saif [29] D Create classifiers able to au-
tomatically identify pro-ISIS
users in social media.
1,132 Twitter users (566 pro-ISIS,
556 anti-ISIS). Annotation based
on the terminology used and the
sharing from known radicalised ac-
counts
Classifiers trained on semantic features outperform
those trained from lexical, sentiment, topic and net-
work features
no
Berger [6] D Create a demographic snapshot
of ISIS supporters on Twitter
and outline a methodology for
detecting pro-ISIS accounts
20,000 pro-ISIS Twitter accounts
(7574 manually annotated to test
classification)
The authors concluded that pro-ISIS supporters
could be identified from their profiles descriptions:
with terms such as succession, linger, Islamic State,
Caliphate State or In Iraq all being prominent
no
Agarwal [2] D Automatic identification of
hate and extremism promoting
tweets
10,486 hate and terrorism-related
Twitter posts (extracted based on
hashtags) + 1M random tweets an-
notated by students for validation
Presence of religious, war related terms, offensive
words and negative emotions are strong indicators of
a tweet to be hate promoting
no
Ashcroft [3] D Automatically detect messages
released by jihadist groups on
Twitter
2,000 pro-ISIS Twitter posts (con-
taining pro-ISIS terminology and
extracted from the accounts 6,729
ISIS sympathisers), 2,000 anti-ISIS
tweets(extracted from manually as-
sessed anti-ISIS accounts), 2000 ran-
dom tweets. Numbers of pro and
anti-ISIS tweets are not reported but
estimated based on the experiments
Fridays are a key date to spread radical tweets. Auto-
matic detection is viable but can never replace human
analysts. It should be seen as a complementary way
to detect radical content.
no
Lara-Cabrera [22]
D
Translate a set of indicators
found in social science models
into a set of computational fea-
tures
17K Twitter posts from pro-ISIS
users provided by Kaggle6. 76K
tweets from pro-ISIS users provided
by Anonymous7. 173K tweets ran-
domly selected
The proposed metrics (mainly based on keywords)
show promising results. More refined metrics can be
proposed to map social science indicators
yes
Ferrara [16] P Propose a computational frame-
work for detection and predic-
tion of extremism in social me-
dia
Over 3M Twitter posts generated
by over 25 thousand extremist
accounts (manually identified, re-
ported, and suspended by Twitter
[15]). 29M posts from the followers
of these accounts
The ratio of retweets to tweets, the average number of
hashtags adopted, the sheer number of tweets and the
average number of retweets generated by each user,
systematically rank very high in terms of predictive
power
no
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Manual analysis of the top 200 accounts was used for evaluating
the proposed scoring.
In 2015 Berger and Morgan [6] aimed to create a demographic
snapshot of ISIS supporters on Titter and outline a methodology
for detecting pro-ISIS accounts. Starting from a set of 454 seed
accounts (identified by previous research [5] and recursively ob-
taining followers of those accounts and filtering them based on
availability of the account, robot identification, etc., they obtained a
final list of 20,000 pro-ISIS accounts to analyse. They estimated that
at least 46,000 pro-ISIS accounts were active (as Dec 2014). They cre-
ated classifiers from a subset of 6,000 accounts that were manually
annotated as ISIS supporters or non-supporters. The authors con-
cluded that pro-ISIS supporters could be identified from their profile
descriptions: with terms such as succession, linger, Islamic State,
Caliphate State or In Iraq all being prominent. When testing this
classifier with 1,574 manually annotated accounts they obtained
94% of classification accuracy. However, profile information is only
available for around 70% of accounts.
In 2015 Agarwal [2] aimed to investigate techniques to auto-
matically identify hate and extremism promoting tweets. Starting
from 2 crawls of Twitter data8 they used a semi-supervised learning
approach based on a list of hashtags (#Terrorism, #Islamophobia,
#Extremist) to filter those tweets related to hate and extremism.
The training dataset has 10,486 tweets. They used random sam-
pling to generate the validation dataset (1M tweets). Tweets were
in english and manually annotated by four students. The created
and validated two different classifiers (KNN and SVM) based on
the generated datasets to classify a tweet as hate promoting or un-
known. By creating and validating these classifiers they concluded
that the presence of religious, war related terms, offensive words
and negative emotions are strong indicators of a tweet to be hate
promoting.
In 2015 Ashcroft [3] aimed to automatically detect messages
released by jihadist groups on Twitter. They collected tweets from
6729 Jihadist sympathisers . Two additional datasets, one of 2,000
randomly selected tweets, and one of tweets from accounts manu-
ally annotated as anti-ISIS, were collected for validation. Numbers
of tweets for the pro and anti-ISIS datasets are not reported, but
based on the provided experiments we estimate they should be
around 2,000 each. SVM, Naive Bayes and Adaboost classifiers were
trained with this data using stylometric, time and sentiment fea-
tures. Authors conclude that Fridays are a key date to spread radical
tweets. Automatic detection is viable but can never replace human
analysts. It should be seen as a complementary way to detect radical
content.
In 2017 Saif [29] proposed a semantic graph-based approach
to identify pro vs. anti-ISIS social media accounts. The authors
developed multiple classifiers and showed that, their proposed
classifier, trained for semantic features, outperformed those trained
from lexical, sentiment, topic and network features by 7.8% on
average F1-measure. Evaluation was done on a dataset 1,132 Twitter
users (with their timelines). 566 pro-ISIS accounts, obtained from
[28] and 566 anti-ISIS users, whose stance was determined by the
use of anti-ISIS rhetoric.
8https://wiki.illinois.edu/wiki/display/forward/SoftwareDatasets
In 2017 Lara-Cabrera [22] translated a set of indicators found
in social science theories of radicalisation (feelings of frustration,
introversion, perception of discrimination, etc.) into a set of com-
putational features (mostly sets of keywords) that they could au-
tomatically extract from the data. They asses the appearance of
these indicators in: (i) a set of 17K tweets from pro-ISIS users pro-
vided by Kaggle9, a set of 76K tweets from pro-ISIS users provided
by Anonymous10 and a set of 173K tweets randomly selected by
opening the Twitter stream. The authors conclude that, while the
proposed metrics show promising results, these metrics are mainly
based on keywords. More refined metrics can therefore be proposed
to map social science indicators.
Regarding the works on prediction we can highlight a recent
work of Ferrara [16]. In this work the authors propose a compu-
tational framework for detection and prediction of extremism in
social media. For this purpose they use a dataset of over 3M tweets
generated by over 25 thousand extremist accounts, who have been
manually identified, reported, and suspended by Twitter [15], and a
dataset of 29M posts from the followers of these users. Random for-
est and logistic regression are used for classification and prediction
based on user metadata and activity features, time features, and
features based on network statistics. Two types of predictions are
made: (i) whether the follower will adopt extremist content (retweet
from a known pro-ISIS account) and (ii) whether the follower will
interact (reply) with a known pro-ISIS account. The authors con-
clude that the ratio of retweets to tweets, the average number of
hashtags adopted, the sheer number of tweets and the average num-
ber of retweets generated by each user, systematically rank very
high in terms of predictive power.
In this section we provided some examples of the types of com-
putational methods that have been developed to analyse, detect and
predict radicalisation. An exhaustive list of works and classification
is provided in the following article by Correa [13]. Various aspects
however can be highlighted from this survey.
• Except the work of Lara-Cabrera [22] we have found no other
computational works grounded on social science theories or
models.
• Radicalisation detection is generally considered as a binary
problem rather than as a process with different degrees or
levels, where classifiers are generated to distinguish pro- vs.
anti- ISIS stances.
• Approaches tend to categorise users based on a few pieces
of their generated content (few comments, their most recent
posts, etc.) but few works consider the complete history of
the user (i.e., their entire timelines) when detecting radicali-
sation
• While most of the identified approaches focus on the analysis
and detection of radicalisation, to the best of our knowledge,
only the work of [16] is focused on predicting radicalisation
We will provide a step forward with respect to previous works
by introducing an approach that integrates the knowledge of social
science models into a computational method to identify the risk of
radicalisation for a user. Rather than treating the problem as a binary
classification, our approach will provide a score that symbolises the
9https://www.kaggle.com/fifthtribe/how-isis-uses-twitter
10https://pastebin.com/u/CyberRog
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influence of radicalisation to which a user is exposed to, based on
the micro, meso and macro roots. As opposed to previous works,
our approach uses the complete timelines of users when measuring
this score, considering radicalisation as a long-term process. In
addition to the detection of the influence or radicalisation in an
individual, our approach also aims to predict the potential future
level of radicalisation influence by employing CF techniques.
3 DETECTING AND PREDICTING
RADICALISATION INFLUENCE
In Section 2, we highlighted how the theoretical models point at
different roots of the radicalisation process (micro, meso and macro)
[31]. Our first task has therefore been to model these roots in terms
of social media content. Once acquired an understanding on how
these three different roots can be identified and represented, we
develop an approach to automatically assess the influence of each
of these roots on a user to determine up to which level she is
undergoing a radicalisation process.
3.1 Modelling Roots of Radicalisation
When a user participates in a social media platform, she can perform
two main actions in terms of posting: (i) creating and posting new
content and (ii) sharing content posted by someone within her
network. In our work we assume that the micro (individual) root is
captured by all the posts that the user has created. Similarly, the
meso (or social) influence is captured by all the post that the user
has shared. We are aware that a user is exposed to more information
than the one that she shares. However, when a user is sharing a
piece of content, it is a strong indicator that that piece of content
has somehow influenced the user who is making it part of her own
ideas and believes. Within the posts that a user creates or shares
from her network we can also find links (URLs) to external sites
(YouTube videos, news sites, blogs, etc.). These sites capture the
macro (global) level of influence over an individual.
Given a user u, her complete timeline in a given social media
platform Pu , her subset of original posts Puo ⊂ Pu , her subset of
shared posts Pur ⊂ Pu , and the set of URLs (links) contained in her
posts Lu , we define the different roots of influence over a user as:
• ⃗Microu = (p1,p2, ...pn ),pi ∈ Puo
• ⃗Mesou = (p1,p2, ...pm ),pj ∈ Pur
• ⃗Macrou = (l1, l2, ...lo ), lk ∈ Lu
Vectors of posts representing the micro and meso influences over
a user are then broken into smaller units, in this case n-grams (uni-
grams, bigrams and trigrams). For that purpose we parse the posts
to remove all URLs as well as numeric and punctuation symbols.
We also remove all stopwords based on the Ranks NL List.11 As in
[30], we also remove all those infrequent n-grams that appear only
once in the corpus. Giving the set of n-grams obtained after pre-
processing all the post,Wp , we define the micro and meso vectors
of the user u as:
• ⃗Vmicrou = (w1,w2, ...wn ),wi ∈ Puo andwi ∈Wp
• ⃗Vmesou = (w1,w2, ...wm ),w j ∈ Pur andwi ∈Wp
11https://www.ranks.nl/stopwords/
Figure 1: Vector representation of roots of radicalisation
The value of each n-gram in the micro vector of the user u is
computed as the frequency of the n-gram in the posts created by
the user, normalised by the number of posts created by the user,
val (wi ) = f req(wi )/|Puo |.
The value of each n-gram in the meso vector of the user u is
computed as the frequency of the n-gram in the posts shared by
the user, Pur , normalised by the number posts shared by the user,
val (w j ) = f req(w j )/|Pur |
In the case of the macro influence, we perform automatic data
scrapping over the URLs included in ⃗Macrou by automatically pars-
ing the HTML and extracting the title and description of the web-
sites. For YouTube videos we also include their titles and descrip-
tions. Giving the set of n-grams obtained after preprocessing all
the linksWl we define the macro vector of the user u as:
• ⃗Vmacrou = (w1,w2, ...wo ),wk ∈ Lu andwk ∈Wl
The value of each word in the macro vector of the user u is
computed as the frequency of the n-gram in all the URL entries
shared by the userLu , normalised by the number of URLsval (wk ) =
f requ (wk )/|Lu |
Please note that, while we include the macro vector in our model,
it has not been possible for us to compute a complete representation
of this vector for all users in our experiments (Section 4). 63% of the
URLs we collected to generate the macro vectors point to tweets,
YouTube videos, and other websites that are now closed. Therefore,
while we keep themacro vector in our model for completeness,
we have discarded it from our analysis. We will therefore use
only the micro and meso vector representations to determine the
level of radicalisation influence over the user.
3.2 Detecting Radicalisation Influence
To measure the influence of each individual root on the radical-
isation process of an individual we based our idea on previous
approaches [6, 22, 28, 35], who have shown that language is a key
descriptor of radicalised behaviour. Our hypothesis is that, if any
of the previous extracted vectors contains radicalised terminology,
that means that there is a certain influence over a user.
Note that, at not point we aim to claim that the user is radi-
calised, but we aim to estimate the level of radicalisation influence
(individual, social, and global) a user is undergoing.
Compiling Radicalisation Terminology. The use of radicalised ter-
minology has been extensively studied in the state of the art from
both, computational and social science approaches. Lexicons have
been developed by experts, and have also been created from ISIS
generated material, such as the Dabiq 12 and Inspire13 magazines.
12https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dabiq_(magazine)
13https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inspire_(magazine)
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Figure 2: ICT Radicalisation Glossary
In this work we have collected, integrated and extended existing
lexicons with the aim of providing a wider set of terms and ex-
pressions representing radicalisation terminology. The integrated
lexicons are summarised below:
• ICTGlossary: created by experts of the International Institute
for Counter Terrorism,14 this glossary contains a total of 100
terms or expressions with their variants in both, English and
Arabic. A screenshot with some of these expressions and
their variants is displayed in Figure 2
• Saffron Experts: created by experts of the Romanian Intelli-
gence Service as part of their participation in the Saffron EU
project.15 This lexicon contains 22 terms and expressions
with their variants, only in English.
• Saffron Dabiq Magazines: this lexicon has been also gen-
erated by the Saffron EU project by compiling the list of
most common terms from 27 editions of the Dabiq and In-
spire Magazines. These magazines are generated by ISIS
and constitute a key medium to spread their propaganda.
This lexicon is composed by 257 English terms, no variants
included.
• Rowe and Saif: this lexicon was generated by [28] and it is
composed of 7 English terms, no variances included.
To merge these lexicons we consider as one unique lexical entry
the term and their variances. We first incorporate syntactic vari-
ances of each term, particularly: (i) lowercase (e.g., Al-‘Adu al-bai‘d
→ al-‘adu al-bai‘d), (ii) removal of apostrophes (e.g., → Al-Adu
al-baid), (iii) removal of hyphens (e.g.,→ Al ‘Adu al bai‘d) and (iv)
removal of diacritics (e.g., Amı¯rul-Mu’minı¯n→ Amir al-Mu’minin).
If two lexicons contain a lexical entry with at least one term in
common, we merge these entries in one unique one in the final
lexicon. The final lexicon contains 305 entries, including 556 terms,
expressions and variances.
Computing Influence. To compute the radicalisation influence of
the different roots over the user u we compute the cosine similarity
between the micro and meso vectors and the generated lexicon L⃗.
As explained in Section 3.1, we have not been able to compute the
macro vectors due to lots of URLs being now closed. We however
add here the computation of macro influence for completeness.
MicroInf luence (u) = sim( ⃗Vmicrou , L⃗) =
⃗Vmicrou • L⃗
| ⃗Vmicrou | × |L⃗|
14https://www.ict.org.il
15http://www.saffron-project.eu/
Figure 3: Individual and Social Influence
MesoInf luence (u) = sim( ⃗Vmesou , L⃗) =
⃗Vmesou • L⃗
| ⃗Vmesou | × |L⃗|
MacroInf luence (u) = sim( ⃗Vmacrou , L⃗) =
⃗Vmacrou • L⃗
| ⃗Vmacrou | × |L⃗|
3.3 Predicting Radicalisation Influence
Collaborative Filtering (CF) strategies make automatic predictions
(filter) about the interests of a user by collecting preference infor-
mation from many users (collaborating )[32]. This approach usually
consists of two steps: 1) look for users that have a similar rating
pattern to that of the active user (the user for whom the prediction
is done), and 2) use the ratings of users found in step 1 to compute
the predictions for the active user. In our model, items are n-grams
(terms and expressions used by the users) and ratings are the values
of those n-grams (computed based on their frequency) in the posts
created and shared by the users. The Purpose of using CF strategies
is to predict the future micro, meso and macro influences for a user.
4 EVALUATION
4.1 Evaluation Set Up
We use two publicly available datasets to study radicalisation, from
Kaggle datascience community. The first dataset contains 17,350
tweets from 112 distinct pro-ISIS accounts.16 Based on a three-
month period study, users were identified using a set of keywords,
such as Dawla, Amaq, Wilayat, etc., and filtered based on their use
of images (ISIS flags, images of radical leaders like al-Baghdadi,
Anwar Awlaki) and on their network of followers/followers.17
The second dataset was created as a counterpoise of the previous
dataset. It contains 122K tweets from 95,725 distinct users collected
on two separate days 7/4/2016 and 7/11/2016. Tweets were collected
based on the following keywords (isis, isil, daesh, islamicstate, raqqa,
Mosul, ’islamic state’).18 Many of these accounts have now been
blocked. To ensure that this dataset contains only users that are
not pro-ISIS (they could be anti-ISIS or neutral), we randomly
selected 112 of them that are still active today. We have collected
the timelines of 112 of these users (197,743 tweets in total). To
16https://www.kaggle.com/fifthtribe/how-isis-uses-twitter
17http://blog.kaggle.com/2016/06/03/dataset-spotlight-how-isis-uses-twitter/
18https://www.kaggle.com/activegalaxy/isis-related-tweets
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Table 2: Classification results
Classifier P R F1 P R F1 avgF1
J48 0.862 0.853 0.857 0.870 0.879 0.874 0.866
N Bayes 0.904 0.895 0.899 0.907 0.916 0.912 0.906
Log R 0.901 0.863 0.882 0.883 0.916 0.899 0.891
verify that these accounts are not pro-ISIS, we randomly selected
and manually checked 40 of these accounts, using two annotators
(authors), who agreed (inter annotator agreement of 1.0 - Cohen’s
Kappa) that these accounts do not show signs of support to ISIS.
Micro and meso influence vectors have been computed for each
of the 224 users based on their tweets and retweets. Regarding
the macro influence vector 5,160 URLs were extracted for the first
dataset and 176,877 for the second one.When collecting information
for those URLs as described in Section 3.1, we discovered that 63%
of those URLs are now closed. These URLs point mainly to other
tweets. We have therefore discarded the global influence from the
rest of our analysis, since this signal is now incomplete for many
of the users in our dataset.
4.2 Results
Figure 3 displays for all users: on the X axis the score of individ-
ual influence (MicroInf luence (u), similarity of the micro vector
and the lexicon) and on the Y axis the level of social influence
(MesoInf luence (u), similarity of the meso vector and the lexicon).
We can observe two distinct clusters differentiating the group of
pro-ISIS vs. general users. As expected, individual and social influ-
ences of radicalisation are both higher for pro-ISIS users. Although
we do not aim to determine radicalisation stances, we created mul-
tiple classifiers to observe how the computed individual (micro)
and social (meso) influence could help differentiating users in both
datasets when used as features for classification. Results of this
classification, using 10-fold cross validation, are reported in Table 2.
All classifiers obtained more than 86% precision, with the best clas-
sifier obtaining an F1 value of 90.6%. The high accuracy is mainly
due to the difference in content posted by the pro-ISIS and by the
neutral accounts.
To evaluate our prediction model we split the timelines of each
user into two sets, the first 80% of the post are used training and
the newest 20% for testing. We use 80% of the data to create the
micro and meso vectors for all users (see Figure 1). These matrices
are then used to predict preferences (with regard to terms and
expressions) for a user by considering the preference information
(micro and meso vectors, for many users). The training data is
therefore composed of a list of user, item, rating, where the items
are the terms and expressions used by the user and the ratings are
their values, val (wi ), computed based on frequencies (Section 3).
To perform our experiments we used the librec library,19 and
tested multiple recommender algorithms and configurations for
our problem.20 Best results were obtained with the asdvpp recom-
mender [20]. As we can see in Table 3, precision is higher for the
neutral user group, while recall is higher for the pro-ISIS group.
Our hypothesis is that the time window of prediction may be a key
influencing factor, since data for the non pro-ISIS group spans a
19https://www.librec.net
20https://www.librec.net/dokuwiki/doku.php?id=AlgorithmList
Table 3: Prediction results for micro and meso vectors
CF algorithim P R MAE
pro-ISIS micro 0.792 0.655 0.068
pro-ISIS meso 0.686 0.711 0.082
neutral micro 0.86 0.66 0.11
neutral meso 0.872 0.51 0.15
longer time period. A key priority is to consider a more fine-grained
definition of time in our future work (see Section 5). The Mean Ab-
solute Error (MAE) value is low in all cases. A low value of MAE
indicates the effectiveness of the models, since it assess the mean
of the absolute differences between the ratings and the predicted
values. While there is ample room for improvement, these results
demonstrate the possibility of predicting the radicalisation influ-
ence, both individual and social, affecting a user by considering
information for many users.
5 DISCUSSION
Detection of online radicalisation is faced by multiple challenges.
From an accuracy perspective, the majority of the “ground truth”
datasets used in previous work lack solid verification. Many such
datasets (e.g., [2, 3, 28]) were collected using sets of keywords,
where users whose tweets contain those words would be regarded
as in the “radicalised” set. However, we continue to observe that
many who use radicalisation terminology in their tweets are simply
reporting current events (e.g., “Islamic State hacks Swedish radio
station’, or sharing harmless religious rhetoric (e.g., “If you want to
talk to Allah, pray. If you want Allah to talk to you, read the Qur’an’’,
or even countering extremism (“armed jihad is for defence of muslim
nation. Not for establishment of khilafah.” ).
There remains a great need for a gold standard dataset of accounts
to be used for training our detection models. Such a dataset should
be manually verified by experts, to ensure that cases such as the
above would not be regarded as in the positive set. Currently, we
are working with law enforcement agencies and experts to be able
to obtain such gold standards. One source of manually identified
radical accounts is Ctrl-sec,21 which uses volunteers to report the
existence of ISIS propaganda in social media. Their initiative claims
to be the one responsible of closing more than 200,000 Twitter
accounts in three years. While these are key mechanisms to fight
online radicalisation, the fact that accounts are rapidly closed once
identified as radical means that data cannot be further collected
and analysed to train automated methods.
From a policing perspective, radicalisation is not a crime. Radicals
from all religions and ideologies can freely express their beliefs and
practice their freedom-of-speech. However, adopting or preaching
for violent-radicalisation is a criminal offence. Nevertheless, none
of the related works we encountered made this distinction. In future
work we will add violence detection to our methods (e.g., [4]).
We have proposed an approach to measure and predict radicali-
sation influence using a keyword-based representations of the roots
of radicalisation and on a combined lexicon of radical terminology.
However, as in the case of generating reliable gold standards, the
use of a bag of words approach can be enhanced to consider other
factors (such as the semantics of the language, or social network
21https://twitter.com/CtrlSec
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structures) for a more complete representation. For example, when
computing the meso vector (or social influence) we are not cur-
rently considering further interactions, such as ’likes’, ’replies’ or
even ’direct messages’. Hence, the social influence could actually
be higher than the one reported in our work. While we took these
aspects into consideration when designing the approach, this infor-
mation is not always available for all social networks, and mostly
not available in the existing datasets, hence we have discarded these
elements for this first version of our model. Similarly, the fact that
many of the URLs shared in those posts are no longer available
have made us taken the decision of discarding the macro influence
out of our analysis.
To perform our predictions we have split the user timeliness into
80-20. However, radicalisation is indeed a process, and therefore, a
more fine-grained temporal analysis can and should be considered
for prediction. As part of our future work we aim to explore tem-
poral models in recommender systems [10], as well as the use of
language models [27] for radicalisation prediction.
To conclude, it is important to highlight that, while in this work
we have integrated the knowledge of social science models by
considering the ’roots of radicalisation’, we have not yet taken into
account the different identified stages and factors (Section 1). There
is ample room for investigation, since all these elements could be
designed and modelled computationally in a variety of ways, which
opens a novel and exciting interdisciplinary line of research.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Creating intelligent technologies to automatically identify online
radicalisation is a key priority of counter-extremist agencies. How-
ever, little effort has been devoted to integrate the knowledge of
existing theories of radicalisation in the development of these tech-
nologies. In this paper we propose a computational approach for de-
tecting and predicting the radicalisation influence a user is exposed
to, grounded on the concept of ’roots of radicalisation’, identified
in social science models. While our approach constitutes a first
step to bridge these disciples, a stronger collaboration is needed to
effectively target the problem online radicalisation.
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